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      <page pageid="182" ns="0" title="Religious discrimination">
        <revisions>
          <rev xml:space="preserve">In order to establish a prima facie case in actions where the plaintiff claims that he was discriminated against because he did not share certain religious beliefs held by his supervisors, we hold that the plaintiff must show 

#that he was subjected to some adverse employment action; 
#that, at the time the employment action was taken, the employee's job performance was satisfactory; and 
#some additional evidence to support the inference that the employment actions were taken because of a discriminatory motive based upon the employee's failure to hold or follow his or her employer's religious beliefs. 

Upon such a showing, the plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of the McDonnell burden-shifting scheme and its presumptions.


Shapolia v. Los Alamos Nat. Lab., 992 F.2d 1033, 1038 (10th Cir. 1993)</rev>
        </revisions>
      </page>
      <page pageid="12" ns="0" title="Res ipsa loquitur">
        <revisions>
          <rev xml:space="preserve">Cases relating to res ipsa loquitur:

 

Walker v. Parish Chemical Co., 914 P.2d 1157 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996).  In Walker, the court defined the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.  It stated:

In Utah, res ipsa loquitur is an evidentiary rule that allows an inference of negligence to be drawn when human experience provides a reasonable basis for concluding that an injury probably would not have happened if due care had been exercised.  To employ the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, plaintiffs initially must establish a foundation from which an inference of negligence can be drawn.  Put another way, before a plaintiff is entitled to a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must have presented evidence that the occurrence of the incident is more probably than not caused by negligence.

 

Id. at 1160, (citations and quotations omitted).  There are two ways a plaintiff can establish this foundation.  The Utah Supreme Court has stated:

The probability that an occurrence was produced by negligence may be established by reference to the common experiences of the community.  When, however, the probabilities of a situation are outside the realm of common knowledge, expert evidence may be used to establish the necessary foundational probabilities.  

 

Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719, 722 (Utah 1985).  The court in Walker, after quoting this language, continued:

Thus, because an instruction on res ipsa loquitur allows a jury to infer negligence from the type of accident itself, “‘there must be a basis either in common knowledge or expert testimony that when such an accident occurs, it is more probably than not the result of negligence.’”

 

914 P.2d 1157, 1161 (quoting Talbot v. Dr. W.H. Groves’ Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 440 P.2d 872, 874 (1968)(quoting Tomei v. Henning, 67 Cal.2d 319, 431 P.2d 633, 635 (1967).</rev>
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